¹“And do they still exist?” This is the first question often asked regarding intrinsically evil acts. Of course, one normally does not think that the state of human spirit today is better than it was before and that, therefore, evil acts of this kind have simply disappeared. Rather, it seems that people often do not believe that there is such a thing as an objective reality of the actions about which real truth can be known. Because of the varieties of different cultures, personal experiences and characteristics, some people are skeptical about objective truth and reality of this kind.² That is why the question of intrinsically evil acts is still at the center of discussions of moral theologians. A discussion restarted with a publication of Humanae vitae³ and continuing until the present day.⁴ It includes the positions concerning concrete urgent problems discussed in the general public like contraception, abortion, artificial procreation, various other medical acts, torture, lying, etc. If such actions are intrinsically evil, they can never be committed under any circumstances. Veritatis splendor expresses it clearly.⁵

Although St. Thomas did not employ the term “intrinsically evil acts,” which came into use only in the 16^th century,⁶ he argues that certain actions cannot be rightly performed under any circumstances and for any end.⁷ However, could Almighty God in certain specific situations give a dispensation from this negative precept? Some biblical cases seem to support this explanation.⁸ In many difficult situations which life brings, it would be convenient to have some kind of mental reservation that would render an otherwise evil act morally permissible, if not good. Is this possible with intrinsically evil actions? With the substantial assistance of St. Thomas Aquinas, in this article we will explore a possible dispensation of the intrinsically evil actions. We will argue that no dispensation is possible when the negative moral absolutes are understood in the formal sense.

1. GENERAL BASIS FOR THE INTRINSICALLY EVIL ACTS

Even after releasing Veritatis splendor,⁹ there are some contemporary Catholic theologians¹⁰ who question the reality of such acts, which are so morally disordered in themselves that they can never be justified, regardless of the intentions, the agent, or the circumstances. A primary argument they raise against intrinsically evil actions is based on the individual person of the agent with all his history and dispositions, and on their different understanding of natural law and its universally binding precepts. Natural law, they claim, does not and cannot include “specific, concrete, behavioral norms, universally binding, which proscribe specifiable kinds of human acts describable in morally nonevaluative language, such as norms proscribing contraception, direct abortion, adultery, etc.”¹¹ In various ways, they assert that the intrinsically evil acts are in themselves only prima facie (pre-moral, non-moral, ontic, or physical) evil, but they cannot be declared morally bad prior to a consideration of their circumstances and end.¹²

These elements seem to them to be neglected by the simple claim that certain physical actions are just despite their object being morally evil. Thus, Veritatis splendor summarizes this position with: “Even when grave matter is concerned, these precepts should be considered as operative norms which are always relative and open to exceptions.”¹³ By affirming the existence of intrinsically evil acts, however, Veritatis splendor did not exclude the personal point-of-view of the acting agent (with his intrinsic intensions, history, personality, and conscience).¹⁴

How is it possible that there are any acts evil “always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances”?¹⁵ Human actions are specified by their end, which is “the origin and the termination of an action in the same time.”¹⁶ The relation between the object and the end of an act is essential for a determination of its moral species because some objects and ends of actions are simply not compatible. If one intends an evil end, his act is evil. When he intends a good end, the act is not necessarily good, since (abstracting, for the moment, from the circumstances of the action, which also affect the morality of the action) it is possible for an act to be evil per se and thus permissible in no way.¹⁷

There are two possible reasons for this claim: 1) These acts cannot be ordered to any due end because they are joined to an evil proximate end.¹⁸ 2) They are generically incompatible with the normative finality of a good life,¹⁹ which is not possible to supersede by any further purposes of the agent because the goodness is from integral causes.²⁰ The integral nature of the act is always materially included within the object of the moral act.²¹ If the acts are not good in themselves, it does not matter what the further intention, the previous history, or personality of the agent may be. They are objectively (ex obiecto) evil, mala in se.

The evaluation of a human act as evil does not mean that there is something which is intrinsically evil in the sense of its essence. That is why, technically speaking, one must understand the phrase “intrinsically evil” as synonymous with the precise description of acts as “objectively evil”—since evil has no proper intrinsic content. It is in this precise and nuanced sense that we interpret and employ the phrase “intrinsically evil acts.”²² The term “intrinsically evil” also supposes the necessary existence of “the extrinsically evil acts” as well, which are the acts not mala in se but determined as such “from outside”—by a decision of a legitimate authority, for example, trespassing certain traffic regulations.

Aquinas never used the formulation “intrinsically evil actions”.²³ But he claims that certain actions must never be done—under any circumstances, or for any end.²⁴ They are bad because of their nature (which comes from their object).²⁵ Just to mention at least some actions that are evil secundum se according to Aquinas, we cite theft, adultery, or murder.²⁶ Similarly, somebody who fornicates commits evil and is not excused by having a good intention, the same as with a person who steals to give an alms, because fornication by its nature has an inordinate end.²⁷ The same thing Aquinas says about lying—it must not be done for any expediency, not even to help someone’s neighbor, because a lie has a disorder inseparably joined to it.²⁸

2. POSSIBILITY OF DISPENSATION

The teaching of St. Thomas on objectively evil acts lines up with the whole tradition of his predecessors like Peter of Poitiers,²⁹ Hugh of St. Cher,³⁰ St. Albert the Great,³¹ or St. Bonaventure,³² who claimed that some actions never can be good because a malicious object is inseparable from them. However, there are a few cases in the Bible where it seems that God either allows or even commands someone to perform such an action. For example: the issue of Abraham who was commanded to kill his innocent son,³³ theft by the Israelites,³⁴ and Hosea seemed to be ordered to fornicate.³⁵ Another very particular subject is that of lying and fraud, which also appears in the Bible,³⁶ and was studied with special care lately in connection with the unjust totalitarian regimes who often want to know and misuse the truth.³⁷ That is why we deal with this issue in the following independent section.³⁸ Now we will proceed to investigate the possibility of the dispensation from prohibition to commit intrinsically evil actions.

When God ordered Abraham to slay his son Isaac, the act of itself would contain a disorder in that an innocent³⁹ person was about to be killed. However, God, the source of life and the Supreme Legislator, is the only one who can order such an act without any injustice: “By the command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice whatever.”⁴⁰ Aquinas teaches that the same applies to evil-doers or foes of the common good who be slain without contravening the precept of the decalogue. Such a killing would not constitute murder.⁴¹ Moreover, this particulate command to kill Abraham’s innocent son served to manifest the faith and the love of Abraham so as to be an example for his descendants (by blood and in faith) and as an image signifying the death of Christ.⁴² And it was to this kind of death ordered by divine authority that the will of Abraham agrees with reason, as St. Thomas states.⁴³

The same goes for Aquinas’s understanding of the Israelites’ stealing from the Egyptians in Ex 12.⁴⁴ God, who is the Lord of all things, has, in some situations, the right to attribute to someone else something that belongs to another. Similarly, legitimate authorities may for a good reason transfer ownership of property, so that taking such an object is not stealing.⁴⁵ In addition to the decision of a legitimate authority, a case of extreme need makes another’s property legitimately one’s own, because “that which he takes for the support of his life becomes his own property by reason of that need.”⁴⁶ Thus, taking the property under such circumstances is not a theft.

Now, in case of Hos 1:2, we think that Hosea was ordered to marry a prostitute, which is expressed by the command: “Take to yourself.” The continuation of the command: “Have children of whoredom,” according to the notes from La Bible de Jérusalem⁴⁷ means just that these children will be the children of a prostitute, not that they would be born from fornication. In our opinion, this interpretation matches better with the fact that the prophet Hosea represents here God in his relationship to the people of Israel who are symbolized by Hosea’s “wife of whoredom.” However, St. Thomas, with the previous tradition of authors,⁴⁸ interprets this case as one of God ordering Hosea to unite to a woman who is not his wife. His solution lines up with what was said before about Abraham sacrificing Isaac, and so, God, who is the source of marriage, can make “that sexual union was not fornicacious which otherwise would have been fornicacious.”⁴⁹

In the decalogue, as well as in every legislation, a legislator cannot cover all possible cases by establishing certain law but only those which occur the most often. A rule for interpretation of laws is then the intention of the legislator. Aquinas uses in the example of someone who does not return his deposit to somebody who fights against the faith or his homeland. In such a case one should act with the virtue called epikeia by Aristotle, which means that the person follows the intention of the legislator rather than the literal law.⁵⁰ The orders which are commanded by the divine law are changeable or can be dispensed with only by divine precept. That is why dispensations would be possible just by a quasi-miraculous operation of God,⁵¹ and are not made in a general manner to all, but rather only to particular persons.⁵²

In his Commentary on the Sentences Aquinas argues that in the order of creatures related to God as their ultimate end, no dispensation is possible (in actions like despair or hatred of God) because if the good from this fundamental ordering disappears no good can remain. But in the order of things in relation one to another, as, for example, in the case of homicide, or disobedience of one’s superior, the goodness from the order of the fundamental relation to God may remain. Therefore, Aquinas states that in these situations “God can dispense but not men.”⁵³ Later, however, St. Thomas develops his opinion and claims that “the precepts of the decalogue [from both tablets] admit of no dispensation whatever.”⁵⁴ He explains that God cannot dispense from the precepts of the decalogue because he would have to deny himself, he who is Justice itself.⁵⁵

Because God creates all things as ordered to a certain end the eternal law ordains human nature to certain types of actions that are proportioned to man’s happiness. Although not every human act is performed in accordance with this end, human nature is per se inclined to cause good actions.⁵⁶ And since the eternal law moves humans to act in accord with their nature, man’s reason is in this way at the foundation of moral actions. Human acts are morally specified by their end, which is the origin and the termination of the act. Thus, the nature of a human action depends principally on the agent’s intention⁵⁷ and the choice of a certain act involves a movement towards the good which is its end. It includes a selection of appropriate means in order to achieve the desired end.⁵⁸ Through the intention of an agent a natural object becomes the moral object of a particular human act.

The most defining and universal moral determination is derived from the end and its relation to the object of the action. If we want to determine the moral species of an action, we must know whether the object is, or is not, by itself ordained to the end of this action. This way of evaluation enables us to properly analyze the most crucial current moral challenges. For example, in the case of euthanasia, killing not only ends pain—which is one’s desired end—but it also per se ends the life of that person. Therefore, to choose it necessarily is to choose non-justifiable homicide.

Thus, no dispensation is possible when the precepts of the decalogue are understood in the formal sense, that is in so far as they contain the order of justice itself. However, the determined ways of observing justice in individual actions differ.⁵⁹ Murder, theft, or fornication are evil because they are contrary to right reason. Man’s reason is right in so far as it is ruled by the Divine Intellect and Will as the first and supreme rule, as St. Augustine states: “For as among the powers of human society, the greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser, so must God in preference to all.”⁶⁰ Therefore, when somebody acts in obedience to a divine command, it is not contrary to right reason, though it may seem to be against the general order of reason. Just as a miracle done by the power of God is not against nature but against the usual course of nature.

3. THE CASE OF LYING

One may assume that the rule of different determinations and applications of justice (as it was said in cases like murder, theft, and adultery)⁶¹ would be valid also for lying. Precisely the important question is this: is it permissible to lie for a good and just reason, for example, to save the life of an innocent? As we have said above, this question is of pressing concern in light of various unjust totalitarian regimes which demand the truth in order to use it against their real or putative enemies. This question has been carefully explored by many scholars. For example, Immanuel Kant considered lying even in order to save one’s life as very bad, because even though a life is spared, the lie undermines the basis of law and contracts.⁶² In Christian terminology, every lie for Kant would be mortally sinful. On the contrary, Lawrence Dewan claims that for Aquinas the lie to save one’s life is “only a venial sin.”⁶³ The famous case of St. Robert Southwell⁶⁴ revealed the doctrine of mental reservation, or equivocation, the origin of which traced back to Martin de Azpilcueta, known also as Doctor Navarrus,⁶⁵ but was developed later mainly by Jesuits in order to avoid telling the truth.⁶⁶

St. Thomas argues that the language was invented “to express what a heart conceives”⁶⁷ and “words were invented to be signs of what was understood.” That is why when someone expresses by words what he does not have in mind—the definition of the word “lie”—there is a disorder by abuse of words.⁶⁸ Thus, every lie not only injures one’s neighbor but has an inordination de se and so never can become good or allowed, no matter what good one lies for. Therefore, Aquinas, citing St. Augustine, concludes that every lie is a sin.⁶⁹ An action is evil either in itself or in its end.⁷⁰ And so, just as it is evil to steal in order to give alms—even though the thief may have a good intention, he has a bad will⁷¹—“it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever.”⁷² Evil may not be done so that good may come of it. And in this case, in addition to a bad will, the action is evil secundum se. But, as Aquinas, together with St. Augustine, states, it is lawful to hide the truth prudently under some dissimulation.⁷³

Now we will look closely at the lies described in the Bible.⁷⁴ Abraham seemed to lie and even instructed his wife Sarah to lie about who she was in order to save his life while they were in Egypt and in Gerar.⁷⁵ However, from Gn 20:12⁷⁶ we know that she was his half-sister, thus, he did not lie, but he hid the truth. In the case of Jacob, who said to his father that he was his firstborn Esau,⁷⁷ St. Thomas explains that it was said in a mystical sense because the birthright was righty his by the election of God, and Jacob was speaking this way in order to express a mystery, that the younger people (i.e., the Gentiles) should supplant the firstborn (i.e., the Jews).⁷⁸ And so, Jacob spoke under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and his words ordered towards the interpretation of the Spirit.⁷⁹

The case of the two midwives of Egypt was different. They lied in the literal sense to Pharaoh.⁸⁰ But they were rewarded⁸¹ not for their lie but for their fear of God⁸² and for their goodwill.⁸³ The subsequent lie was not, however, meritorious.⁸⁴ The same rule applies in the case of Rahab when she deceived the king of Jericho,⁸⁵ and Judith when she lied to Holofernes.⁸⁶ We might say, though, that Judith was telling truth in a mystical sense.⁸⁷ Thus, a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words are naturally signs of thought, it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind.⁸⁸

One may still ask how a virtuous man should act in the following famous situation: during the Second World War, for example, the virtuous man hides some Jews in his house and Nazis ask him if he knows about the location of any Jews. First of all, he should not be satisfied with the proposition that a lie under these circumstances would only constitute a venial sin, as some authors have suggested.⁸⁹ Every sin is evil no matter how bad it is because it is not ordered to the truth about the good, and the principal rule for a moral life is that good is to be done and pursued while evil is to be avoided.⁹⁰ Second, in the case of somebody hiding Jews during the Second World War, the host must be prepared for a Nazi inspection. Therefore, normally, the Jews would not be watching television in the living room. In case of an unexpected arrival of unknown people, the Jews would probably be hiding in some secret parts of the house.

Of course, it would be understandable if the proprietor of the house in this situation of extreme anxiety did not react perfectly. But a morally impeccable answer to the menacing Nazis would be something like “Come and look,” which would fit well with Aquinas’s permission “to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back,”⁹¹ or the Catechism’s proposition that: “No one is bound to reveal the truth to someone who does not have the right to know it.”⁹² This observation from the Catechism, of course, presents a type of non-disclosure that is not, of itself, disordered. Silence in the face of an unjust question is not the same as a lie in response to an unjust request.

CONCLUSION: OBJECTIVE TRUTH ABOUT OBJECTIVE REALITY

We began this article with some people’s questioning the objective reality and truth. This is why they would find convenient if an exception to, or a dispensation from the intrinsically evil acts exists. If objective truth and reality do not exist, what is man left with in such a case? The caprices of human appetite replace the eternal law of God’s wisdom.⁹³ Then, man “creates” and imposes various “realities” and “truths,” he himself determines what is good and what is evil, and so man becomes “god” according to his primordial project found in the Garden of Eden.⁹⁴ If one makes his own reality and his own truth about this reality, somebody else legitimately follows the same process and, therefore, creates his own different truth and reality. The validity of someone’s beliefs is acknowledged only as valid for himself. Relativism enforces the principle that “truth” is a fluid concept that is determined by one’s own subjective preferences, experiences, and perspectives.⁹⁵ This relativism, no doubt, has also entered into morals with its fluidity regarding good and evil in human actions. Thus, certain theologians claim that an evil act in itself can become good when some additional circumstances are taken under consideration.⁹⁶

In the end, no dispensation from the prohibition of committing an intrinsically evil act is possible. That is why even God cannot command anybody to lie. Such a command would contain an essential contradiction. When God ordered Abraham to kill his innocent son, this act was not objectively evil since God is the Source and Lord of life, and, therefore, he can kill and command such an act, just as someone can kill an assailant in legitimate self-defense without any moral violation. In case of a lie, it does not only injure one’s neighbor but also has a disorder de se (because of the abuse of words⁹⁷ by which one expresses what he does not have in mind) and thus, never can become good or allowed, no matter how good the reason for which one lies may be. Even with a mental reservation evil cannot be done so that good may come of it.

Evil acts that violate the order of right reason fail to substantiate the divine goodness and wisdom. They oppose the ultimate achievement of human nature.⁹⁸ Even in the case of ignorance, good intentions, or inconvenient circumstances, such actions are always harmful not only to their patient but also to their agent, because they cause him to deviate him from his perfection and they prohibit and frustrate his transformative union with Christ who is also a real source of freedom and goodness.⁹⁹ Only good acts lead their authors to happiness, because by their nature they are related to the divine Good, on which they participate.

JUDr. Ing. Peter Samuel Lovás, OP., STL.

Sts. Cyril and Methodius Faculty of Theology

Palacký University Olomouc

Univerzitní 22

779 00 Olomouc

Czech Republic

Published in Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica 12, č. 1 (2022): 127–141. DOI: 10.14712/23363398.2022.21

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